Close Menu
  • Home
  • Articles
    • Attacks
      • BEC
      • Data Breach
      • DDoS
      • Evasion Attacks
      • Injection
      • Malware
      • MITM
      • Phishing
      • Ransomware
      • RCE
      • Social Engineering
      • Spoofing
      • Spyware
    • Business and Policy
      • BCP and DRP
      • GRC
      • Regulations
    • Data Protection
      • DLP
      • DRM
      • Encryption
      • IAM
    • Future, Trends and Insight
      • AI
      • Events & Community
      • Emerging Tech
      • Expert Panel
      • Interviews With Experts
      • Insights
      • Study & Research
    • Resources
      • Guides
      • Tools
      • Training & Education
    • Security
      • API
      • Apps
      • Cloud
      • Critical Infrastructure
      • Endpoint
      • Hardware
      • IoT
      • Mobile
      • Network
      • OT
      • Port Security
      • Security Architecture
      • Software Development
      • Supply Chain
      • Zero Trust
    • Threats and Vulnerabilities
      • Emerging Threats
      • Insider Threats
      • Risk Management
      • Threat Intelligence
      • Zero Day
  • News and Exclusives
    • Latest News
    • ISB Exclusive
    • Positive News
  • Who We Are
    • About Us
    • Information Security Buzz Expert Panel​
    • Write for Us
    • Media Pack
  • Contact Us
  • Newsletter
Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn
Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn
Information Security BuzzInformation Security Buzz
  • Home
  • Articles
    • Attacks
      • BEC
      • Data Breach
      • DDoS
      • Evasion Attacks
      • Injection
      • Malware
      • MITM
      • Phishing
      • Ransomware
      • RCE
      • Social Engineering
      • Spoofing
      • Spyware
    • Business and Policy
      • BCP and DRP
      • GRC
      • Regulations
    • Data Protection
      • DLP
      • DRM
      • Encryption
      • IAM
    • Future, Trends and Insight
      • AI
      • Events & Community
      • Emerging Tech
      • Expert Panel
      • Interviews With Experts
      • Insights
      • Study & Research
    • Resources
      • Guides
      • Tools
      • Training & Education
    • Security
      • API
      • Apps
      • Cloud
      • Critical Infrastructure
      • Endpoint
      • Hardware
      • IoT
      • Mobile
      • Network
      • OT
      • Port Security
      • Security Architecture
      • Software Development
      • Supply Chain
      • Zero Trust
    • Threats and Vulnerabilities
      • Emerging Threats
      • Insider Threats
      • Risk Management
      • Threat Intelligence
      • Zero Day
  • News and Exclusives
    • Latest News
    • ISB Exclusive
    • Positive News
  • Who We Are
    • About Us
    • Information Security Buzz Expert Panel​
    • Write for Us
    • Media Pack
  • Contact Us
  • Newsletter
Subscribe
Information Security BuzzInformation Security Buzz
Home - Attacks - Invitation Is All You Need: How Researchers Used a Calendar Event to Hijack Gemini Agents
Attacks Artificial Intelligence Emerging Threats Latest News News & Analysis Threats and Vulnerabilities

Invitation Is All You Need: How Researchers Used a Calendar Event to Hijack Gemini Agents

Kirsten DoyleBy Kirsten DoyleAugust 11, 20254 Mins Read
Share LinkedIn Twitter Facebook Copy Link Email
Calendar Event to Hijack Gemini Agents
Share
Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Copy Link
Quick AI Summary
ChatGPTClaudeGeminiGrokPerplexityDeepSeekCopilot

A Google Calendar invite. That’s all it took.

Researchers from SafeBreach Labs have shown that an LLM-powered assistant like Google’s Gemini can be tricked into running malicious commands, accessing sensitive data, and even manipulating physical devices in a victim’s home, without a single click.

Their work introduces a new variant of Promptware, called Targeted Promptware Attacks. The concept is simple. An attacker embeds a malicious instruction inside a calendar event title or email subject line. When Gemini retrieves that data, for instance, when a user asks “What’s on my calendar?”, the hidden instruction slips into the model’s context and is treated as if the user had asked for it.

From there, the attack can cascade.

The New Face of Promptware 

Promptware is malicious input (text, images, or audio) designed to exploit an LLM at inference time. Traditionally, such attacks were seen as impractical, requiring deep knowledge of a target model. This research challenges that view. 

With Gemini, the team showed how an indirect prompt injection could trigger:

  • Sending spam or phishing messages 
  • Generating toxic content 
  • Deleting calendar events 
  • Controlling connected devices like lights or windows 
  • Tracking a victim’s location 
  • Starting a Zoom video stream 
  • Exfiltrating emails and other sensitive data

The scope goes beyond digital damage. By abusing Gemini’s integration with Google Workspace and Android utilities, the attack can bridge into the physical world.

The Exploit in Action 

The team tested Gemini’s three main interfaces: the web version, the mobile app, and the voice assistant on Android. The Calendar invite became the delivery vehicle for their attack.

A malicious event name, hidden among legitimate entries, poisoned the assistant’s context. Gemini, seeing it as part of the user’s own request history, executed the embedded instructions.

In demonstrations, the researchers forced Gemini to open malicious websites (revealing the victim’s IP address), control smart home devices, or even force the user into a Zoom meeting, all from a single indirect injection. 

One technique, called Delayed Tool Invocation, used Gemini’s “Show more” button in Calendar. Even if the victim didn’t expand the view, those hidden events still entered the assistant’s context. This allowed instructions to be triggered later,  for example, when the victim simply said “Thanks.”

Why It Works

LLMs like Gemini don’t understand “malice” in the way humans do. They follow instructions in context, assuming they come from the user. If the poisoned instruction is buried inside trusted data (think a calendar event or email) the assistant has no reason to reject it.

This is what makes Targeted Promptware dangerous. It hijacks not just a chatbot, but the trusted voice of a system the user relies on. A phishing link from Gemini doesn’t look like a scam. It looks like your assistant helping you out. 

The Bigger Risk

Using their Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) framework, the researchers found that 73% of the Promptware threats they identified were High-Critical. Many could be executed with minimal attacker expertise or resources.

Promptware also enables lateral movement. The attack can jump between Gemini’s own agents, and then escape to other apps and devices, a leap traditional malware can’t always manage.

The researchers believe new variants are coming, including “0-click” attacks that don’t require user interaction and broadcast-style attacks targeting mass audiences.

Google’s Response

The team disclosed their findings to Google in February 2025. By June, Google had deployed new defenses, including: 

  • Enhanced user confirmations for sensitive actions 
  • Stricter URL handling and sanitization 
  • Content classifiers to detect prompt injection

Google called the research “valuable” and said it accelerated mitigation efforts. 

What It Means for the Industry

Promptware isn’t theoretical anymore. It’s practical, effective, and as this research shows, alarmingly easy to deliver. Any LLM-powered assistant that integrates with personal data or device controls is at risk.

For security teams, the message is clear: treat Promptware as a first-class threat. Conduct formal risk assessments. Deploy mitigations now. And assume the attack surface has already shifted from memory exploits to LLM context manipulation.

A calendar invite shouldn’t be able to open your windows or stream from your camera. But until the industry takes this class of attack seriously, it can. 

Kirsten Doyle
Kirsten Doyle
Information Security Buzz News Editor

Kirsten Doyle has been in the technology journalism and editing space for nearly 24 years, during which time she has developed a great love for all aspects of technology, as well as words themselves. Her experience spans B2B tech, with a lot of focus on cybersecurity, cloud, enterprise, digital transformation, and data centre. Her specialties are in news, thought leadership, features, white papers, and PR writing, and she is an experienced editor for both print and online publications.

  • Kirsten Doyle
    AI-Powered Attacks Become Top Concern for Security Professionals, New Filigran Survey Reveals
  • Kirsten Doyle
    ShinyHunters targets Oracle PeopleSoft customers through critical zero-day
  • Kirsten Doyle
    SIG report: AI-generated code is linked to twice the security risk and rising technical debt
  • Kirsten Doyle
    Miasma worm spreads from Red Hat packages to Microsoft repositories

The opinions expressed in this post belong to the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Information Security Buzz.

Share. Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Copy Link

Related Posts

Miasma worm spreads from Red Hat packages to Microsoft repositories

June 11, 20264 Mins Read

Dutch police, NCSC take down major botnet

June 4, 20264 Mins Read

CrowdStrike, Google, and Shadowserver Foundation disrupt Glassworm botnet

June 1, 20265 Mins Read
ISB-Bora-Side-Bar

No se ha podido establecer conexión. Error 429

 
ISB-Bora-Side-Bar
Black ISB Logo

Information Security Buzz is an independent resource that provides the experts’ comments, analysis, and opinion on the latest Cybersecurity news and topics

X (Twitter) LinkedIn Facebook RSS

Working With Us

  • About Us
  • Advertise With Us
  • Contact Us

Write For Us

  • How To Contribute

The Pages

  • Privacy Policy
  • Cookie Policy
  • AI Policy
  • Terms & Conditions
  • Copyright Notice

Information Security Buzz and all its contents are copyright © 2014-2025. All rights reserved. All third-party trademarks are recognized.

Type above and press Enter to search. Press Esc to cancel.

Manage Consent
To provide the best experiences, we use technologies like cookies to store and/or access device information. Consenting to these technologies will allow us to process data such as browsing behavior or unique IDs on this site. Not consenting or withdrawing consent, may adversely affect certain features and functions.
Functional Always active
The technical storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user, or for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network.
Preferences
The technical storage or access is necessary for the legitimate purpose of storing preferences that are not requested by the subscriber or user.
Statistics
The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes. The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for anonymous statistical purposes. Without a subpoena, voluntary compliance on the part of your Internet Service Provider, or additional records from a third party, information stored or retrieved for this purpose alone cannot usually be used to identify you.
Marketing
The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes.
  • Manage options
  • Manage services
  • Manage {vendor_count} vendors
  • Read more about these purposes
View preferences
  • {title}
  • {title}
  • {title}