Operation Arid Viper Slithers Back into View

By   ISBuzz Team
Writer , Information Security Buzz | Sep 29, 2015 05:00 pm PST

Earlier this year, researchers published analyses of targeted attack known as Operation Arid Viper [1] (aka Desert Falcons [2], aka DHS) directed primarily at organizations in the Middle East. Delivering a backdoor and spyware, this campaign was designed to steal information from infected systems using a malware client capable of filtering out “uninteresting” files, and spread primarily via a targeted phishing email usually promising a pornographic video.

The infection chain described in the initial analyses was fairly straightforward: To access the video content, the recipient had to open an attached RAR archive file – or less frequently, click a link to a RAR – that extracted an SCR (Windows screensaver) file, which in turn drops two files: a malicious EXE with the name of a legitimate file (such as “skype.exe”), and a video format file, usually FLV or MPG.

Despite the apparent severity and extent of this threat, little has been written about it in the intervening months, and the operation appeared to be dormant. However, Proofpoint researchers recently intercepted and analyzed phishing emails distributing Arid Viper malware payloads with some noteworthy updates.

As with the originally documented examples, these messages were part of narrow campaigns targeting specific industry verticals: telecoms, high tech, and business services, primarily in Israel.

In these samples, the spear-phishing email contained a link to a RAR file hosted on MediaFire – no attachments were observed. Instead of a pornographic video, the actors showed a change in TTP by using as lure a video of a fiery automobile accident.

התאונה בכביש // Road accident

וידיו מזעזע דלפ תקשורת // And his shocking leaked to the media

Clicking the linked RAR brings up a prompt to download the file “this.morning.rar” to their computer.

arid-viper-slithers-1The file “this.morning” is a RAR self-extracting (SFX) archive (cd89897a2b6946a332354e0609c0b8b4). Once downloaded, the user opens the RAR which extracts what appears to be a video file named “this.morning”.

arid-viper-slithers-2In fact, double-clicking RAR SFX extracts and executes two files contained in this archive :

  • A non-malicious video file: this.morning.flv (41bf348254b921bbd21350a70f843683)
  • The malware payload: chrome.exe (2ae0f580728c43b3a3888dfbe76ad689)

arid-viper-slithers-3In this regard, the infection chain is still similar to that described in the original Operation Arid Viper analysis, but with noticeable changes to the filenames and email lure, among others. The end user will see the promised video, while in the background the malicious “chrome.exe” begins is communication with the command and control (C2) server: in both cases the action is automatic and initiated simply by double-clicking the self-extracting the RAR SFX archive, with no further interaction by the end-user needed.

The following is an example of the initial C2 beacon :

Image1And this is an example of the C2 server response :

Image 2The malware payload still uses the type of hard drive and a set of numbers as a unique identifier; for example: VMware-VMwareVirtualSSCSIDisk—[redacted].. Moreover, the malware compile time appears to be quite recent.


The Trojan continues to exhibit its behavior of downloading an update following the first C2 communication, and in this case Proofpoint researchers succeeded in patching the initial malware to obtain the second stage malware payload (3a401a679d147b070eb8ccae5df3dc43), which allowed us to observe more activities.

Previously described as the Operation Arid Viper backdoor, the second stage payload was observed in traffic to be obfuscated with standard base64-encoding. The second-stage backdoor has a compile date prior to the first stage malware by nearly a day.

arid-viper-slithers-5During the infection process, the Arid Viper malware makes multiple HTTP GET requests to register the client with the server and check for updates :

Image 3In addition, the backdoor POSTs data back to the server :

Image 4The Arid Viper backdoor also sends GETs to confirm the existence of interesting data / files, with the path and filenames included in the request. The following exchanges show the GET request (with filename and path in bold), and C2 server response (i.e., “OK”) :

Image 5Image 6Image 8In addition, analysis of the Arid Viper backdoor binary shows evidence of keylogging capabilities :

Image 9As well as the ability to steal browser data :

Image 10

The Arid Viper backdoor encrypts data to be exfiltrated in order to avoid detection, and after additional analysis Proofpoint researchers succeeded in determining its encryption routine.

Data Exfiltration

The updated data exfiltration of the new Arid Viper backdoor functions similarly to previously documented versions. The table below lists some of the different functionalities paired with the actor-assigned indicator, which can be seen in both the HTTP client body along with exfiltrated data as well as in the URI once exfiltration is complete.

Image 11Captured C2 traffic provides an example of the network traffic seen during a msn data exfiltration.

arid-viper-slithers-6Although the data that is exfiltrated and the manner in which it is gathered remain largely the same as in previously documented versions, the final result that is transmitted to an attacker-controlled server has changed significantly. In an older version of this backdoor (md5: aefea9d795624da16d878dc9bb81bf87), exfiltrated data was simply base64-encoded using a slightly modified base64 alphabet (“-” instead of “+”). In the newer version, prior to base64 encoding the exfiltrated data is first encrypted with AES-256 in CBC mode. The encryption process is depicted in Figure 5 and explained below.


To generate the key/IV pair, first the malware randomly generates 60 bytes of data. From this, the first 32-bytes are used for the key, the next byte is skipped, and the following 16 bytes are used for the IV. After encryption, the key, separator byte, IV, leftover bytes and padding are then encoded into a 512-byte block of data and prepended to the encrypted data. The encoded key/IV and encrypted data are then base64-encoded using the same modified alphabet. Just like in the older version, this data is then appended to the final variable in the POST’s HTTP client body and sent to an attacker-controlled server.

Reinventing the wheel

Numerous examples over the years have served to remind us that designing your own cryptography implementation is difficult and usually ill-advised. The authors of the updated Arid Viper backdoor seem to have overlooked this lesson for, although certain measures have been taken to protect the generated secret keys and IVs, their implementation is susceptible to a brute force attack, often capable of finding the correct key/IV combination in less than one second. Cracking the encryption scheme applied to the traffic in Figure 4 reveals the following decrypted cleartext.

arid-viper-slithers-8Determining the encryption scheme that is applied to the updated Arid Viper backdoor’s exfiltrated data enables us to better detect C2 communication while also rapidly determining the extent and impact of the data breach carried out by the malware client.


In summary, this update to Operation Arid Viper demonstrates that despite its relatively low profile since February the Arid Viper / Desert Falcons threat still has teeth and remains a risk for organizations in Israel and elsewhere. While the overall attack profile observed in recent examples remains similar to the originally documented campaigns, the recent campaigns exhibit several important updates:

  • Use of links instead of attachments
  • New lures: still using pornographic video but most recent detections also included lures for auto accident footage
  • New executable name: originally reported using “skype.exe” (and variations on “skype”), the recent samples used “chrome.exe”
  • New C2 domains
  • Added encryption for exfiltrated data

The return of Operation Arid Viper shows that targeted attacks can remain a threat even – and especially – when they are no longer in the headlines.


  1. Visit HERE.
  2. Visit HERE.


Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Observed C2 domains and IP addresses:

  • smilydesign [.] com /
  • yalladesign [.] net /
  • oowdesign [.] com /
  • coldydesign [.] com /

Attachment and payload hashes for this sample :

  • this.morning.rar – cd89897a2b6946a332354e0609c0b8b4
  • this.morning.exe – 2ae0f580728c43b3a3888dfbe76ad689
  • RtlUpd.exe – 3a401a679d147b070eb8ccae5df3dc43

Attachment and payload hashes for all campaigns observed since July 1 :

  • 8dc2cef74f9e577b431ad3569c894dc07c8c429ef04235936587ac0e70e2993c
  • d3c184840805a280895387bf321a15a3dfc6af28314983c535e332cbcee7faf0
  • 9cd995095d351b31512fc8866f21bc90624306408a6552879a7dc9317848d877
  • e6e65932473a14d2d104c11234a391fc68c6874f06054a7a019facf5da9498a8
  • f05e913be22eebb19143886b75ca59842d9ce6cf355c23375aa80fdbccad3ec0
  • 343674e2b89e6e786ba08718e0672f3ff21a826c6a4e6e4f41dbd5af3157031d
  • c21891edf9a88953fe49c2aa24ed51e093004a865269ac88a5f3fc149762bd2b
  • 658f63baa9dd4fcc031114ea579e3423d19cb81128a5c577cc5ad10c669b950f
  • 1710997941193e52e6251638cf80e8ea6a520624f5ebe4583f974252cb8d4881
  • 94f0f5f4849632fd68cce11f6247bb90e426842aa8aee8974f5b0abea2a85748
  • 16c687fdb35ec21482b5b07aee274fdc4fc8c5c0928cb5de441c5b3e84ba98ad
  • ff73aa398636a01595d4762a925e1e1b976f85306663c22e7200db74c093f27e
  • 56a3ee282a25fbb234651fe3771574056576aa68e25e05587c5a443ddd0f59fc
  • d7de32c9ab9265d1dd900688c91d3468e05f88f98bd67bbd883450db44df045e
  • 39fc67689c28a31183a7e1d499e8a4bfeb06fc629cf567c1b6c245edb6564d16
  • 1f3b4ceea2e3054162260bb827a5c867d5615b15c68e065d97a99a892d5cad4e
  • 109d248b9dabb019e4d2d82552c63d84ab14e931af40c6f3a09a3df3a40212f2
  • 03eff13ea629acfff6416d95f674195b4fbaa158914e8f9d5ac1f5e094a60fae

Files and paths indicating infection :

  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\AudRT.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\AudRTx32.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\AudRTx86.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\cn.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\ffmencrypt_secret.key
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\ffmUntitled
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\ffsk
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\ffsk1
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\files
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\flfiles
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\fmencrypt_secret.key
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\fmUntitled
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\fsk
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\fsk1
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\gfile
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\gmencrypt_secret.key
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\gmUntitled
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\gsk
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\gsk1
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\IM.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\imencrypt_secret.key
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\ImRt.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\ImRtx86.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\imUntitled
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\isk
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\isk1
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\lmencrypt_secret.key
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\lmUntitled
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\lsk
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\lsk1
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\mmencrypt_secret.key
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\mmUntitled
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\msk
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\msk1
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Realtek.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\rfiles
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\rfmencrypt_secret.key
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\rfmUntitled
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\rfsk
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\rfsk1
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\RRTM.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\RRTM.dllm
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rt.inf
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rtd.ini
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rtf.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rtf32.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rtf64.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rtg.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rtgx32.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rtgx64.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rtled.tmp
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rtlupd.conf
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\RTlx32.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\RTlx64.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\RTlx86.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\RTM.dll
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rtrfl
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rttr.dlt
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\Rttr.zip
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\tmencrypt_secret.key
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\tmUntitled
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\tsk1
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek0.txt
  • C:\Program Files\Realtek\REF\OK


The following Yara rule can detect the updated Arid Viper backdoor traffic :



author = “Proofpoint Staff”

info = “avid viper update”


$s1 = “ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-/”

$s2 = “SELECT * FROM Win32_DiskDrive” wide ascii

$s3 = “Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run” wide ascii

$s4 = “\\dd\\vctools\\vc7libs\\ship\\atlmfc” wide ascii


$s4 and 2 of ($s1,$s2,$s3)


In addition, Proofpoint Emerging Threats (ET) has a variety of signatures for detecting older and updated versions of Arid Viper and Desert Falcons.

Arid Viper :

  • ET Open signatures: 2020431-2020454
  • ET Pro signatures: 2812701, 2812729

Desert Falcon :

  • ET Open: 2020459, 2020461, 2020462, 2020464-2020469, 2020472

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